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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
ASHLAND DIVISION 
 
APRIL MILLER, ET AL., 
 
  Plaintiffs, 
 
 v. 
 
KIM DAVIS, ET AL., 
 
  Defendants. 
 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
 
 
CIVIL ACTION 
 
0:15-CV-00044-DLB 
 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
DAVID L. BUNNING 
 
KIM DAVIS, 
 
  Third-Party Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, in his official 
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, and 
WAYNE ONKST, in his official capacity 
as State Librarian and Commissioner, 
Kentucky Department for Libraries and 
Archives, 
 
  Third-Party Defendants. 
 
 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
 
 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STAY THE AUGUST 12, 2015  
INJUNCTION ORDER PENDING APPEAL 
       
 Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Kim Davis (“Davis”), by and through her undersigned 
counsel, hereby submits this Reply to Plaintiffs’ response to Davis’ Motion to Stay the August 12, 
2015 Injunction Order pending her appeal of that order to the Sixth Circuit. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In their response to Davis’ immediate and emergency motion to stay the injunction entered 
on August 12, 2015 pending her already-filed appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Plaintiffs have utterly 
failed to meet the weight of authority and arguments presented by Davis in her request for a stay. 
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Rather than address the merits of Davis’ motion to stay, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel instead 
rehash prior assertions, ignore compelling precedent in marriage cases, and cast improper and 
thinly-veiled threats at Davis and her counsel based upon hearsay-laden misrepresentations. As 
noted previously, this case presents a matter of first impression resolving a constitutional “tension” 
and “conflict” that this Court acknowledged, and this Court should grant a stay of the August 12, 
2015 injunction until Davis’ appeal is finally resolved. 
II. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. This Court Need Only Conclude That This Case Presents Serious Questions 
Going To The Merits Or Matters Of First Impression To Warrant A Stay 
Pending Appeal.          
 In their response, Plaintiffs rehash and recycle by reference their arguments for a 
preliminary injunction (see D.E. 46 at 1), but they ignore entirely the Sixth Circuit precedent that 
a stay pending appeal is appropriate if the movant raises “serious questions going to the merits” or 
matters of first impression. See Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 
945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Simon Prop. Group, Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 262 
F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (finding that a party seeking a stay “can satisfy this element 
where substantial legal questions or matters of first impression are at issue”); see also United States 
v. Coffman, No. 09-181, 2010 WL  4683761, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 12, 2010) (Caldwell, J.) 
(granting motion to stay pending appeal after finding that “this case will present the Sixth Circuit 
with an issue of first impression”).  
 Plaintiffs do not even address this Court’s conclusion that “this civil action presents a 
conflict between two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence,” thereby 
acknowledging that Davis’ religious rights are, in fact, being both “threaten[ed]” and “infringe[d]” 
in this matter. See D.E. 43 at 2; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2638 (2015) 
(predicting an “inevitable” conflict between First and Fourteenth Amendment as individuals “are 
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confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples”) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, this Court need not reverse itself, 
change its mind, or reconsider its conclusions in its August 12, 2015 memorandum opinion and 
order to nonetheless find that Davis sufficiently satisfies the first factor warranting a stay pending 
her appeal to the Sixth Circuit. 
B. The Remaining Factors Also Support A Stay Pending Appeal. 
 Although this Court sided with Plaintiffs in the “conflict” of rights between Plaintiffs and 
Davis in its August 12, 2015 memorandum opinion and order, it remains well-settled law that the 
“‘loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.’” Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). It is also in the public’s interest to protect First 
Amendment liberties, Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1490 
(6th Cir. 1995), which the Supreme Court unanimously held remain in place despite the 
redefinition of “marriage,” see Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (“persons” are protected under the 
First Amendment) (Kennedy, J., majority); see also id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). Here, there is no relief available 
to Davis later in this litigation if she is forced to violate her religious conscience now. See Mich. 
Coal., 945 F.2d at 153. The issuance, authorization, and approval of a SSM license is the act that 
violates her conscience and substantially burdens her religious freedom. The record is clear that 
this harm is at her doorstep: Plaintiffs have already sought a SSM license—but only after Davis 
had filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s August 12, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
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and only after Davis had also filed an emergency Motion to Stay the August 12, 2015 Injunction 
Pending Appeal. See D.E. 46-2.1 
 In comparison, Plaintiffs do not face irreversible harm if they are unable to exercise a 
newfound constitutional right in this Court’s August 12, 2015 memorandum opinion and order to 
have their same-sex “marriage” authorized and approved by a particular person in a particular 
county. Prior marriage decisions, which Plaintiffs flatly ignore, support a stay while this 
constitutional “conflict” and “tension” is resolved by a court with “final say.” For instance, 
Plaintiffs fail to even address (let alone distinguish) the stay order entered in the case of Bourke v. 
Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), where Judge Heyburn concluded: “Perhaps it is 
difficult for Plaintiffs to understand how rights won can be delayed. It is a truth that our judicial 
system can act with stunning quickness, as this Court has; and then with sometimes maddening 
slowness. One judge may decide a case, but ultimately others have a final say. It is the entire 
process, however, which gives our judicial system and our judges such high credibility and 
acceptance. This is the way of our Constitution. It is that belief which ultimately informs the 
Court’s decision to grant a stay.” Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
 Moreover, in other marriage decisions arising from Sixth Circuit district courts, completely 
different Sixth Circuit panels (each of them including a Judge from this Court sitting by 
designation) granted an emergency motion to stay pending an appeal of the district court’s 
marriage decision, see, e.g., April DeBoer, et al. v. Richard Snyder, et al., No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. 
                                                 
1  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, Davis did not “ignore” this Court’s injunction (see D.E. 46 at 2) but instead 
took immediate and appropriate steps to protect her legal rights and forestall enforcement of the order while the Sixth 
Circuit decides the constitutional “conflict” and “tension” this Court acknowledged. Further, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel cast disparaging remarks and thinly-veiled threats against Davis and “Davis’ attorneys” based upon factually 
vacant and hearsay-laden misrepresentations. See D.E. 46 at 2-3 (citing D.E. 46-1). Such aspersions are wrong, and 
their counsel’s adoption of same in the response brief are unseemly and improper. See Ex. A, Ltr. to V. Puente, et al., 
Demanding Correction Pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 411.051, 411.061, dated Aug. 14, 2015. 
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Mar. 25, 2014), and overturned a district court’s refusal to grant a stay pending an appeal of the 
district court’s marriage decision, see, e.g., Valeria Tanco, et al. v. William Haslam, et al., No. 14-
5297 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014). In these cases, like Bourke, the stays entered preserved natural 
marriage laws but absolutely barred same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses (or having 
marriage licenses recognized) until appeals were resolved. But here, the named Plaintiffs can 
indisputably obtain a Kentucky marriage license even with this Court’s staying the August 
12, 2015 injunction pending appeal, from more than 130 marriage licensing locations spread 
throughout Kentucky. Without dispute, nothing physically or economically prevents these named 
Plaintiffs from obtaining a marriage license from any of these locations. Moreover, Davis’ claims 
are based upon enumerated and individual Constitutional and statutory rights she holds as a person. 
 Finally, although the circumstances of this case support the granting of a stay pending 
appeal, Plaintiffs also raise no argument in response to Davis’ alternative request for a temporary 
stay of the injunction to allow her time to make a similar request to the Sixth Circuit. Thus, at a 
minimum, this Court should grant a temporary stay for Davis to petition the Sixth Circuit. 
III. REPLY CONCLUSION 
 For all the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Davis’ prior briefing, Davis’ Motion to 
Stay The August 12, 2015 Injunction Order Pending Appeal should be granted. 
DATED: August 14, 2015          Respectfully submitted: 
 
A.C. Donahue 
Donahue Law Group, P.S.C. 
P.O. Box 659 
Somerset, Kentucky 42502 
Tel: (606) 677-2741; Fax: (606) 678-2977 
ACDonahue@DonahueLawGroup.com 
 
/s/ Jonathan D. Christman 
Roger K. Gannam 
Jonathan D. Christman 
Liberty Counsel 
P.O. Box 540774 
Orlando, Florida 32854 
Tel: (800) 671-1776; Fax: (407) 875-0770 
rgannam@lc.org/jchristman@lc.org 
 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 
Kim Davis 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed via the Court’s ECF 
filing system and therefore service will be effectuated by the Court’s electronic notification system 
upon all counsel or parties of record: 
Daniel J. Canon     Jeffrey C. Mando 
L. Joe Dunman     Claire Parsons 
Laura E. Landenwich     ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & 
CLAY DANIEL WALTON ADAMS, PLC  DUSING, PLLC 
462 S. Fourth Street, Suite 101   40 West Pike Street 
Louisville, KY 40202     Covington, KY 41011 
dan@justiceky.com     jmando@aswdlaw.com 
joe@justiceky.com     cparsons@aswdlaw.com 
laura@justiceky.com 
       Attorneys for Defendant Rowan County 
William Ellis Sharp 
ACLU OF KENTUCKY 
315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300 
Louisville, KY 40202 
sharp@aclu-ky.org 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
 I also hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing will be sent via 
U.S.P.S. first class mail to the Attorney General of Kentucky on behalf of Third-Party Defendants 
Steven L. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, and Wayne Onkst, Commissioner of the Kentucky 
Department for Libraries and Archives, at the following location: 
Attorney General Jack Conway 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
700 Capitol Avenue, Suite 118 
Frankfort, KY 40601-3449 
 
 
DATED: August 14, 2015    /s/ Jonathan D. Christman 
       Jonathan D. Christman 
Attorney for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 
Kim Davis 
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